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A popular conception in the mind/brain
sciences today is the metaphor of the
brain as a computer. According to the
computational theory of mind, all relevant
cognition consists of executing some well-
defined rules over representations which
model (and have a direct correspondence
to) the external world (Chalmers, 1996).
I would like to challenge this notion and
advocate a pluralistic/biological approach
to cognition, specifically with respect to
explaining emotions. In the following, I
take explanatory pluralism to be the pro-
gram of explaining complex phenomena
by theories operating on multiple levels of
measurement/explanation. I furthermore
suggest that theories should be system-
atically connected (reduced by showing
implementation, if possible) to theories at
other levels. The necessity of biological
modeling is probably self-evident to most
neuroscientists. However, many theories in
cognitive science and psychology present a
certain functional constellation of which it
is not clear how/if it relates to lower levels.
These theories fall under the algorithm-
oriented framework of cognitivism, which
guides the study of thought in terms of
abstract processes in some architecture of
the mind/brain.
A framework which emphasizes the
body in place of abstract processes—
embodied cognition—has gained traction
in the last decades and seems to have
an indispensable advantage over cogni-
tivism in that it allows for explanations
which span multiple levels. Furthermore,
it allows these explanations to be embed-
ded in the body and environment. I argue
that affective neuroscience has revealed
that emotions are such an embodied phe-
nomenon requiring description on mul-
tiple levels—including (but not limited
to) the neurochemical, the systemic, and
behavioral. I conclude that the use of
algorithmic explanation (as opposed to
simulation) should be limited and sub-
ject to verification within such a plu-
ralistic epistemological landscape. In the
following, drives are intended to denote
homeostatic behavioral processes which
are dependent on interoceptive represen-
tation. Emotions are intended to denote
an affective state with cognitive, behav-
ioral, and embodied components, thus
subsuming drives. Attitudes are intended
to denote long-term behavioral (especially
object-directed) tendencies resulting from
a history of emotional experiences.
1. EMOTION: A MULTIFACETED
PHENOMENON
Modern embodied theories of emotions
do not conceive of the process in a linear
top-down or bottom-up fashion. Rather,
causation is circular, such that cognition
can trigger embodied reactions as well
as vice versa. Thus, affective processes
are nonlinear and situation-dependent.
Furthermore, affective processes are now
seen to involve a distributed set of
brain systems with many causal path-
ways (Levine, 2009). Affective neuro-
science generally acknowledges that basic
drives arise out of dynamic topographical
mapping of body states in the brain stem
(Thivierge and Marcus, 2007; Damasio,
2012), which are perceived either as
pleasant or unpleasant arguably ultimately
depending on whether they are conducive
to the maintenance of biological home-
ostasis (Damasio and Carvalho, 2013).
This occurs through an interaction with
dispositional circuits which implement
these basic tendencies and thus evalu-
ate the body states to produce valence
(Panksepp, 2005). Drives provide biolog-
ically important motivational states which
are purportedly re-represented in various
sections of the insula, and combined with
various cognitive and reward-related brain
circuits in the anterior insula (Mayer,
2011). Furthermore, they influence higher
cognition (such as attention) by means of
the major neurotransmitter systems (i.e.,
dopamine, serotonin, noreadrenaline, and
acetylcholine) which lead from the brain
steam to various areas all over the neo-
cortex (Bechara and Damasio, 2005). A
prominent example of the influence of
homeostasis on cognition is in the bidi-
rectional communication system between
the gut and the brain which makes use of
interoceptive representation and has sig-
nificant implications for mood, decision-
making, and psychiatric disorders (Mayer,
2011).
However, drives are by far not the
only determinant in the activity of the
major neurotransmitter systems which are
key to emotional processes, and, more
generally, they are not the only fac-
tor in the multifaceted phenomena col-
lectively referred to as emotion. It is
now generally accepted that emotion
is a complex phenomenon composed
of motor-expressive, sensory-perceptual,
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autonomio-hormonal, cognitive-
attentional, and affective-feeling aspects
(Panksepp, 2003). Thus, it may be use-
ful to consider an ontological category
of core affect, defined as a neurophys-
iological state determining consciously
accessible processes of pleasure and activa-
tion (Russell and Lisa, 1999). Core affect
is said to be composed of various dis-
tributed circuits. Most notably, a circuit
involving the basolateral complex of the
amygdala, the central/lateral orbitofrontal
cortex, as well as the anterior insula seems
to be responsible for integrating sensory
representations with higher cognition
and establishing conscious perception of
valenced interoceptive states. Reciprocal
connections between the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex, the anterior cingulate
cortex, and the amygdala are thought to
determine embodied emotional reactions
via connections to the hypothalamus and
brain stem (Barrett and Lindquist, 2008).
These embodied reactions, in turn, can
affect cognitive processes such as attention,
memory, and learning in various ways
via the major neurotransmitter systems
which begin in the brainstem. Thus, for
instance, norepinepherine can be utilized
to focus attention and further processing
on particularly relevant/salient (perhaps
threatening) stimuli (Aston-Jones and
Cohen, 2005). Or, as particularly relevant
for Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis,
dopamine signals reward prediction infor-
mation to higher brain areas (Bechara and
Damasio, 2005).
In order to integrate core affect into a
comprehensive outline of emotion, cogni-
tive appraisal must be taken into account.
Barrett’s (2014) conceptual act theory of
emotion deals with this by positing that
core affective states are categorized by
the same domain-general systems which
support other conceptualization. In this
theory, top-down processing from the
same ventral circuitry which establishes
the core affective state directs attention
toward an object which the affective state
is interpreted to be about. Conversely,
perception of an object triggers affec-
tive and behavioral associations by the
same mechanisms, such as drawing atten-
tion to the fear-inducing stimulus and
triggering the flight response. In gen-
eral, cognition about the current situ-
ation based on the exteroceptive cues
will modify which sensorimotor/affective
states are recalled (Barsalou, 1999; Bechara
and Damasio, 2005; Wilson-Mendenhall
et al., 2013). On the other hand, per-
ception and recall of affective states can
be impaired. For one, affective states can
take an unusual pathway and uncon-
sciously modify behavior (Winkielman
and Berridge, 2004). It can also be the case
that the core affective state associated with
an emotional category cannot be prop-
erly recalled, resulting in a lack of under-
standing of the behavioral implications of
being in said emotional state—otherwise
known as an empathy gap (Loewenstein,
2005). This phenomenon has been stud-
ied especially for subjects who find them-
selves in either a hot or a cold state, and
fail to appreciate how a person would act
in the opposite state. Thus, for instance,
young adults make many unhealthy deci-
sions when in a cold state because they
fail to recognize how sickness would feel.
In conclusion, it should be said that emo-
tion as a whole is difficult to distinctly
characterize because the division between
emotion and cognition is not clear-cut,
but rather gradual—many structures and
processes (as mentioned above) are shared




The results of affective neuroscience seem
to support the conclusion that emotion is
an emergent phenomenon within a com-
plex (multi-level), dynamic, and embod-
ied system—therefore, it does not seem
to lend itself to algorithmic explanation.
One major blow to the view that the brain
should be explained in terms of rules and
representations comes from the reality that
the neural structure at any of the layers
of control is not fixed, but ever subject
to plasticity (Mareschal et al., 2007). This
means that not only are the cortical maps
redrawn (and synapses modified/created,
generally speaking), but also their modes
of processing being adjusted subneurally
in various cellular and neurochemical phe-
nomena (Mozzachiodi and Byrne, 2009).
Furthermore, (interoceptive) neural maps
are commonly recognized (and highly
important) organizational structures that
operate dynamically in three senses: they
persistently synchronize with the state of
the body, are modified by plasticity, and
engage in feedback loops with higher
maps and cognitive areas (Petersen and
Diamond, 2002; Thivierge and Marcus,
2007). Furthermore, processes relevant to
emotion operate on a biochemical, sys-
temic/neural, as well as behavioral (e.g.,
social) level of organization/explanation.
One thus arrives at the necessity of
describing (or simulating) emotional phe-
nomena in terms of dynamical systems on
multiple levels, as many parts of the brain
(including cognitive ones) interact in non-
linear ways and their mode of processing
ever subject to feedback (Faure and Korn,
2001). Thus, emotions are inmanyways an
emergent phenomenon, where any given
emotional episode is a gestalt arising out of
the idiosyncratic and pluralistic constella-
tion of (cognitive, embodied, and situated)
processes at that given moment (Barrett
et al., 2007).




Progress in science unequivocally depends
on a continual examination of the evi-
dence for the existing theories. Thus, if
there is to be a computational theory of
the mind/brain of any scope, it must be
subject to the same rigorous empirical
examination that more naturalistic theo-
ries are subject to. That is not to say that
there is no place for theories which are
only loosely inspired by the brain, and
employed to solve specific problems—as is
the case in applied artificial intelligence. I
intend to target, first and foremost, the-
ories of mind/brain function and general
intelligence.
Initially, it must be established what
an acceptable computational explanation
consists of. I take computational expla-
nation to be the use of computational
scientific models to explain the func-
tional structure of a physical system,
rather than merely attempting to repli-
cate some existing physical theory in
a computer. Chalmers (1996) has given
a suitable (but debatable) definition of
when a physical system implements an
abstract computation. In essence, he states
the causal structure of the physical sys-
tem must reflect the causal structure
of the abstract computation, including
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FIGURE 1 | A simple implementation and a non-implementation. The correspondence
between states/transitions is color coded for the implementation. The transitions in green in the
physical system can be seen as transitions leading from the green state in the abstract system to
itself. e1 and e2 indicate possible events marking the transitions between states. In the
non-implementation, the fact that e2 leads away from state A’ (instead of back to A) prevents the
existence of a consistent mapping to states/transitions in the abstract system.
counterfactual conditions. This means
that one should be able to show which
(groups of) physical (brain) states cor-
respond to which abstract (algorithmic)
states, and which physical transitions cor-
respond to which abstract transitions.
The technical notion of this mapping is
called an isomorphism. Figure 1 displays
a very simple example of when physical
states/transitions do and don’t implement
an abstract system, respectively.
The principles from neuroscience sug-
gest that emotion does not admit such a
description. The phenomena on the neural
level (and above) are already highly com-
plex, and the subneural (neurochemical or
lower physical) phenomena additionally
play a crucial role in generating emotions
and attitudes. Emotions are yet another
reason to suggest that the embodied brain
does not operate like a traditional com-
puter. I suggest that until implementation
is shown for any aspect of the brain, com-
putation should be seen as a tool for simu-
lation rather than explanation. A technical
elucidation of this difference can be found
in Piccinini (2007) This difference is cru-
cial, for it means that unless a functional
correspondence between the brain and an
abstract system can be shown, scientific
theories thereof should be grounded in
naturalism and its digital implementations
should as closely as possible mirror the
biological system. I believe this is also a
lesson for (general) artificial intelligence,
which could benefit frommore neuromor-
phic architectures such as Chris Eliasmith’s
Spaun (Eliasmith et al., 2012).
Instead ofMarr’s (1982) tripartite levels
of explanation explicitly serving computa-
tionalism, the mind/brain sciences should
have an epistemological landscape which
respects the various levels of organization
at which phenomena underlying cognition
exist at and emerge from de Jong (2002). In
doing so, the framework of embodied cog-
nition can be fleshed out to emphasize the
common molecular/sub-molecular levels
of description that the brain shares with
the environment. The body is then located
somewhere in between—sharing more
(biological) levels with the brain than
the environment, but not the highest
ones necessary for cognition. In general,
I contend that the study of cognition
would benefit from attempting to make
inter-level connections between theories.
This exercise has the potential to both
critically evaluate the biological viability of
theories, as well as providing a mechanism
for unifying previously distinct ones. If the
ultimate goal of science is to be able to
explain as comprehensively as possible, it
is only a disservice to ignore certain levels
in favor of one limited framework. Only in
pluralism can one truly explain the emer-
gent phenomenon of emotion, and more
generally, cognition.
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